This study considered the competition between two multi-echelon supply chains with identical structures on price under two market power structures. For this purpose, two di erent scenarios were developed. In the rst scenario, both supply chains decided simultaneously (the Nash game). In the second scenario, due to the imbalance of power between the two supply chains, the Stackelberg game was adopted in the model. The paper investigated the e ects of di erent relations between the market sizes of supply chains and the supply chain structures on price and pro t along with the analysis of power in the market. Based on these assumptions, it was found that the supply chains did not always involve the second-mover advantage in the price Stackelberg game. Furthermore, having the centralized structure, both of the supply chains bene ted from the presence of a leader in the market for di erent combinations of market size. Moreover, the relationship between price and pro t was analyzed given the size of the market in di erent scenarios rather than through provision of numerical examples.
